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The Influence of Corporate Lobbying on Federal Contracting
Author(s) -
Dusso Aaron,
Holyoke Thomas T.,
Schatzinger Henrik
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
social science quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.482
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1540-6237
pISSN - 0038-4941
DOI - 10.1111/ssqu.12665
Subject(s) - legislature , politics , procurement , executive branch , yield (engineering) , power (physics) , business , economics , public administration , political science , marketing , law , materials science , physics , quantum mechanics , metallurgy
Objective Corporations spend significant resources lobbying for billions of dollars in federal procurement contracts, yet this important opportunity to assess the political influence of business has gone unstudied by scholars of business politics. We study it here. Methods We approach it by analyzing the influence of direct lobbying of five federal departments, along with data on the lobbying of, and campaign contributions to, members of Congress on patterns of contract awards broken out by congressional districts. Results Our analysis reveals that while there are many reasons to expect lobbying Congress to produce valuable contracts, we instead find that it is the direct lobbying of executive branch agencies that is most likely to bring big rewards. Conclusion These results highlight the importance of studying corporate political power outside of the legislative branch, suggesting that it is the long‐term relationships that lobbyists build with bureaucrats that yield the most lucrative contracts.