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Legislative Seniority in the Partisan Congress *
Author(s) -
Taylor Andrew J.
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
social science quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.482
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1540-6237
pISSN - 0038-4941
DOI - 10.1111/ssqu.12616
Subject(s) - seniority , legislature , legislation , demise , test (biology) , house of representatives , commodity , political science , economics , public administration , law , finance , paleontology , biology
Objective Despite the formal seniority system's demise, long‐serving members of the U.S. House of Representatives continue to demonstrate disproportionate legislative effectiveness in what scholars universally consider a strong‐party era. I test a bonding model of the continued utility of legislative seniority in an effort to understand the causal mechanism. Methods I use regression and multilevel mixed effects analyses of roll‐call and co‐sponsorship data in the U.S. House from the 1990s and early 2000s to test hypotheses derived from the model. Results The results are consistent with a process in which senior members attract support for their legislation through relationships cultivated over time. Seniority does not act like a commodity. Conclusion Seniority continues to provide value to its holders in the House by providing them opportunities to strengthen bonds with colleagues used to build coalitions for their legislative proposals.