Premium
Electoral Consequences of Lawmaking Activities for State Legislative Incumbents *
Author(s) -
Hogan Robert E.,
Kromer Mileah K.,
Wrzenski Rhonda L.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
social science quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.482
H-Index - 90
eISSN - 1540-6237
pISSN - 0038-4941
DOI - 10.1111/ssqu.12238
Subject(s) - lawmaking , legislator , legislature , legislation , state (computer science) , public economics , productivity , economics , political economy , political science , law , macroeconomics , algorithm , computer science
Objective Do incumbent state legislators who introduce many bills or have high passage rates for their proposals receive an electoral benefit for these efforts? If so, where is such an electoral advantage manifested? Is it a direct effect whereby voters are more likely to recognize and reward a legislator's productivity? Or is the effect more indirect whereby potential candidates are less likely to challenge an active incumbent? Methods These questions are addressed in an analysis of legislative elections in 18 states over two election cycles. Results Within the low‐information environment of state legislative elections, there is evidence of both direct and indirect effects of lawmaking activities. Higher rates of bill passage decrease the likelihood that incumbents are challenged in primaries. Bill passage also reduces the likelihood they face well‐financed opponents in the general election. Incumbents who introduce more legislation ultimately receive larger vote shares in general elections. Conclusions Introducing and passing legislation can enhance an incumbent's prospects for reelection.