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Selecting Constitutional Judges Randomly
Author(s) -
Vandamme PierreÉtienne,
Bello Hutt Donald
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
swiss political science review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.632
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1662-6370
pISSN - 1424-7755
DOI - 10.1111/spsr.12416
Subject(s) - legitimacy , champion , selection (genetic algorithm) , supreme court , certification , democracy , political science , law , politics , law and economics , democratic legitimacy , diversity (politics) , sociology , computer science , artificial intelligence
Abstract This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposal for the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining the values of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process – selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. We argue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specific legitimacy of courts, and we champion this two‐stage mechanism vis‐à‐vis other, more traditionally employed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal and conclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations.