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Emotion: Animal and Reflective
Author(s) -
Naar Hichem
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/sjp.12359
Subject(s) - simple (philosophy) , epistemology , psychology , class (philosophy) , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy
According to the judgment theory of emotion, emotions necessarily involve evaluative judgments. Despite a number of attractions, this theory is almost universally held to be dead, for a very simple reason: it is overly intellectualistic . On behalf of the judgment theorist, I defend a simple strategy, namely, to claim that her view is restricted to a special class of emotions, a strategy that is rooted in a plausible distinction between two broad classes of emotion. It turns out that, if the judgment theory is to be rejected, such rejection cannot be based on the charge that it overintellectualizes emotions.

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