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Meaning in Life: In Defense of the Hybrid View
Author(s) -
Evers Daan,
van Smeden Gerlinde Emma
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/sjp.12179
Subject(s) - meaning (existential) , virtue , face (sociological concept) , counterexample , epistemology , meaning of life , psychology , element (criminal law) , sociology , social psychology , philosophy , mathematics , law , social science , political science , discrete mathematics
According to Susan Wolf's hybrid view about meaning in life, a life is meaningful in virtue of subjective attraction to objectively valuable pursuits. Recently, several philosophers have presented counterexamples to the subjective element in Wolf's view. We argue that these examples are not clearly successful and present a modified version which is even stronger in the face of them. Finally, we offer some positive reasons for accepting a subjective condition on a meaningful life.