Premium
A Contextualist Approach to Higher‐Order Vagueness
Author(s) -
Montminy Martin
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/sjp.12177
Subject(s) - vagueness , contextualism , predicate (mathematical logic) , epistemology , philosophy , philosophy of language , linguistics , metaphysics , computer science , interpretation (philosophy) , programming language , fuzzy logic
According to contextualism about vagueness, the content of a vague predicate is context sensitive. On this view, when item a is in the penumbra of the vague predicate ‘ F ’, speakers may (truly) utter ‘ Fa ’, or they may (truly) utter ‘not‐ Fa ’, without contravening the literal meaning of ‘ F ’. Unlike its more popular variants, the version of contextualism I defend rejects the principle of tolerance, a principle according to which small differences should not affect the applicability of a vague predicate. My goal is to show how such a rejection allows for a plausible treatment of higher‐order vagueness, and for a dissolution of paradoxes of higher‐order vagueness.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom