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Learning and the Development of Meaning: Husserl and Merleau‐Ponty on the Temporality of Perception and Habit
Author(s) -
Howell Whitney
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/sjp.12116
Subject(s) - temporality , perception , phenomenology (philosophy) , meaning (existential) , psychology , epistemology , openness to experience , cognitive psychology , social psychology , philosophy
In this paper, I argue that the temporal openness of perceptual experience provides insight into the basic structure of learning. I draw on Husserl's account of the mutability of the retained past in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis , and Merleau‐Ponty's account of the perceptual field, as well as his remarks on habit, in Phenomenology of Perception , in order to elucidate the relation between the perceptual past and the future it portends. More specifically, I argue that retention and habituation in perceptual experience open dimensions of meaning that transform the initial, initiating, experiences in which meaning is first established. As a result, our experience of meaning is always subject to further development that we cannot anticipate. This temporal openness has consequences for our learning to navigate a perceptual field, but also, I argue, for our developing more complex ways of engaging with the world. Specifically, I show how learning requires that we commit ourselves to an object or task before we are in a position to recognize the implications or significance of our commitment. I further consider the role that others play in the inherent openness of learning to the development of new meaning.