Locke on the Ontology of Persons

The importance of J ohn L ocke's discussion of persons is undeniable. L ocke never explicitly tells us whether he thinks persons are substances or modes, however. We are thus left in the dark about a fundamental aspect of L ocke's view. Many commentators have recently claimed that L ockean persons are modes. In this paper I swim against the current tide in the secondary literature and argue that L ockean persons are substances. Specifically I argue that what L ocke says about substance, power, and agency commits him to the claim that persons are substances. I consider the passages mode interpreters cite and show why these passages do not imply that L ockean persons are modes. I also respond to two objections anyone who thinks L ockean persons are substances must address. I show that a substance reading of L ocke on persons can be sympathetic and viable. I contend that with a clearer understanding of the ontological status of L ockean persons we can gain a firmer grasp of what L ocke's picture of persons looks like. Finally, once we are armed with a better understanding of L ocke on substance, mode, and personhood, we can pave the way toward a more nuanced description of the early modern debate over personal identity.