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Kantian Moral Retributivism: Punishment, Suffering, and the Highest Good
Author(s) -
O'Connell Eoin
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/sjp.12090
Subject(s) - retributive justice , wrongdoing , morality , virtue , punishment (psychology) , philosophy , epistemology , psychology , law , social psychology , economic justice , political science
Against the view of some contemporary K antians who wish to downplay K ant's retributivist commitments, I argue that K ant's theory of practical of reason implies a retributive conception of punishment. I trace this view to Kant's distinction between morality and well‐being and his attempt to synthesize these two concerns in the idea of the highest good. Well‐being is morally valuable only insofar as it is proportional to virtue, and the suffering inflicted on wrongdoers as punishment for wrongdoing is morally good so long as it is proportional to the wrongdoing. According to Kantian retributivism, punishment is warranted as a means to promote proportionality between well‐being and virtue.