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Moral Imagination, Perception, and Judgment
Author(s) -
Biss Mavis
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/sjp.12050
Subject(s) - epistemology , moral disengagement , relation (database) , perception , action (physics) , moral authority , moral psychology , scope (computer science) , section (typography) , moral reasoning , imagination , social cognitive theory of morality , practical reason , sociology , psychology , social psychology , philosophy , computer science , physics , operating system , quantum mechanics , database , programming language
Abstract This paper develops an account of moral imagination that identifies the ways in which imaginative capacities contribute to our ability to make reason practical in the world, beyond their roles in moral perception and moral judgment. In section 1, I explain my understanding of what it means to qualify imagination as ‘moral,’ and go on in section 2 to identify four main conceptions of moral imagination as an aspect of practical reason in philosophical ethics. I briefly situate these alternative ideas in relation to standard accounts of moral perception and judgment with reference to some guiding examples. In section 3, I argue that the fourth conception of moral imagination, moral imagination understood as the capacity to generate new possibilities for morally good action, is not well accounted for within the standard categories of practical reason. Section 4 clarifies the scope and importance of this capacity and defends its claim to increased theoretical attention.