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The Missing‐Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well‐Being
Author(s) -
Lauinger William
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/sjp.12016
Subject(s) - epistemology , psychology , philosophy
Many philosophers have claimed that we might do well to adopt a hybrid theory of well‐being: a theory that incorporates both an objective‐value constraint and a pro‐attitude constraint. Hybrid theories are attractive for two main reasons. First, unlike desire theories of well‐being, hybrid theories need not worry about the problem of defective desires. This is so because, unlike desire theories, hybrid theories place an objective‐value constraint on well‐being. Second, unlike objectivist theories of well‐being, hybrid theories need not worry about being overly alienating. This is so because, unlike objectivist theories, hybrid theories place a pro‐attitude constraint on well‐being. However, from the point of view of objectivists, hybrid theories are not objectivist enough, and this can be seen clearly in missing‐desires cases. For instance, hybrid theories entail that, if someone lacks the desire for health, then health is not a component of her well‐being. This, objectivists say, is implausible. It is obvious, objectivists say, that someone's life goes better for herself inasmuch as she is healthy, and, hence, that health is a component of her welfare. This paper focuses on the missing‐desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to hybrid theories of well‐being. My argument is that the missing‐desires objection can be answered in a way that is generally convincing and, in particular, in a way that pays a good deal of respect to objectivist intuitions about well‐being. My hope, then, is that this paper will help to persuade objectivists about well‐being to become hybrid theorists.

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