z-logo
Premium
Rehabilitating Warranted Assertibility: Moral Inquiry and the Pragmatic Basis of Objectivity
Author(s) -
Frega Roberto
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the southern journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.281
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 2041-6962
pISSN - 0038-4283
DOI - 10.1111/sjp.12006
Subject(s) - objectivity (philosophy) , assertion , epistemology , normative , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , computer science , medicine , programming language
This article defends a pragmatic conception of objectivity for the moral domain. I begin by contextualizing pragmatic approaches to objectivity and discuss at some length one of the most interesting proposals in this area, C heryl M isak's conception of pragmatic objectivity. My general argument is that in order to defend a pragmatic approach to objectivity, the pragmatic stance should be interpreted in more radical terms than most contemporary proposals do. I suggest in particular that we should disentangle objectivity from truth, and I claim that moral inquiry is in most cases responsive to a normative standard that is closer to warranted assertibility than to truth. Using an argument that relies partly on H uw P rice's account of forms of normative assertion, I will show that a practice‐based account of warranted assertibility does the epistemic work required to defend objectivity while avoiding exposure to the criticisms that are usually addressed against this notion.

This content is not available in your region!

Continue researching here.

Having issues? You can contact us here