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Signaling about Norms: Socialization under Strategic Uncertainty
Author(s) -
Adriani Fabrizio,
Sonderegger Silvia
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/sjoe.12240
Subject(s) - reputation , norm (philosophy) , socialization , social psychology , economics , microeconomics , psychology , sociology , political science , law , social science
Abstract We consider a signaling model in which adults possess information about the dominant social norm. Children want to conform to whatever norm is dominant but, lacking accurate information, take the observed behavior of their parents as representative. We show that this causes a signaling distortion in adult behavior, even in the absence of conflicts of interest. Parents adopt attitudes that encourage their children to behave in a socially safe way (i.e., the way that would be optimal under maximum uncertainty about the prevailing social norm). We discuss applications to sexual attitudes, collective reputation, and trust.