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Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy
Author(s) -
Acconcia Antonio,
Immordino Giovanni,
Piccolo Salvatore,
Rey Patrick
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/sjoe.12080
Subject(s) - witness , deterrence (psychology) , agency (philosophy) , deterrence theory , economics , criminology , law , political science , law and economics , sociology , social science
We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade‐offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice‐witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice‐witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.