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Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch
Author(s) -
Deutscher Christian,
Frick Bernd,
Gürtler Oliver,
Prinz Joachim
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/sjoe.12036
Subject(s) - commit , german , test (biology) , economics , tournament , empirical evidence , microeconomics , empirical research , computer science , paleontology , philosophy , mathematics , archaeology , epistemology , combinatorics , database , biology , history
Abstract In this paper, we address the problem of sabotage in tournaments with heterogeneous contestants. In a first step, we develop a formal model, which yields the prediction that favorites exert higher productive effort, while underdogs are more tempted to engage in destructive actions (sabotage). This is because favorites have a higher return on productive effort and both types of effort are substitutes. In a second step, we use data from German professional soccer to test this prediction. In line with the model, we find that favorite teams win more tackles in a fair way, while underdog teams commit more fouls.