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Is Transparency To No Avail? *
Author(s) -
Swank Otto H.,
Visser Bauke
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/sjoe.12029
Subject(s) - transparency (behavior) , secrecy , accountability , suspect , democracy , economics , democratic governance , doors , public relations , law and economics , business , accounting , political science , law , computer science , politics , operating system
Transparent decision‐making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens might suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else would there be the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision‐making that explains the public's demand for transparency, and committee members' aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre‐meetings away from the public eye. Transparency does not improve accountability, but it might improve the decision.