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Truth, Trust, and Sanctions: On Institutional Selection in Sender–Receiver Games *
Author(s) -
Peeters Ronald,
Vorsatz Marc,
Walzl Markus
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/sjoe.12003
Subject(s) - communication source , sanctions , cheap talk , economics , lying , institution , stochastic game , logit , microeconomics , selection (genetic algorithm) , computer science , econometrics , law , political science , telecommunications , artificial intelligence , medicine , radiology
We have conducted a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth‐telling and trust in sender–receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth‐telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions, and they are more likely to choose the sanctioning institution. Sanctioning and non‐sanctioning institutions coexist if their choice is endogenous, and the former shows a higher level of truth‐telling but lower material payoffs. Our experimental findings are consistent with logit agent quantal response equilibrium with two distinct groups of individuals: one consisting of subjects who experience non‐monetary lying costs as senders and non‐monetary costs when being lied to as receivers, and the other consisting of payoff maximizers.