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Does Tariff Induce Intellectual Property Right Protection and Reduce Incidence of Piracy?
Author(s) -
Acharyya Rajat,
Banerjee Dyuti S.
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
review of international economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.513
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-9396
pISSN - 0965-7576
DOI - 10.1111/roie.12263
Subject(s) - tariff , intellectual property , outcome (game theory) , economics , international economics , product (mathematics) , incidence (geometry) , international trade , business , microeconomics , law , political science , mathematics , optics , physics , geometry
We consider a model with North exporting a copyrighted product to South where there is IPR violation, and South exports a basic good to North. We examine the impact of North's imposition of import tariff on South's monitoring of IPR violation and the incidence of piracy. If South values IPR compliance “lowly”, then tariff imposition do not alter the pre‐tariff no monitoring equilibrium outcome but unambiguously raises the incidence of piracy. If IPR compliance is valued “highly” then tariff either switches the equilibrium outcome from not monitoring to monitoring or increases its rate. However, the incidence of piracy may increase.