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Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option
Author(s) -
Hefeker Carsten,
Neugart Michael
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
review of international economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.513
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-9396
pISSN - 0965-7576
DOI - 10.1111/roie.12182
Subject(s) - economics , monetary economics , inflation (cosmology) , fiscal union , fiscal policy , monetary policy , monetary hegemony , central bank , international economics , macroeconomics , physics , theoretical physics
It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.