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Attacker Deterrence and Perceived Risk in a Stackelberg Security Game
Author(s) -
Ridinger Garret,
John Richard S.,
McBride Michael,
Scurich Nicholas
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
risk analysis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.972
H-Index - 130
eISSN - 1539-6924
pISSN - 0272-4332
DOI - 10.1111/risa.12547
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , computer security , guard (computer science) , deterrence theory , stochastic game , preference , expected utility hypothesis , computer science , microeconomics , economics , mathematical economics , political science , law , programming language
In Stackelberg security games, a defender must allocate scarce resources to defend against a potential attacker. The optimal defense involves the randomization of scarce security resources, yet how attackers perceive the risk given randomized defense is not well understood. We conducted an experiment where attackers chose whether to attack or not attack targets protected by randomized defense schemes, the key treatment variable being whether the defender picks one target at random to guard or imperfectly guards all targets. The two schemes are expected‐payoff equivalent, and when provided separately we found no effect of having one scheme or the other. Yet, when both are present, we found that subjects had a preference for the fixed scheme, a preference that cannot be reduced to differences in beliefs. Overall, our results suggest that understanding how individuals perceive risk is vital to understand the behavior of attackers.