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Prosecutorial regulation in the G lobal S outh: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in C hina compared to B razil
Author(s) -
Shi Yifan,
Rooij Benjamin
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
regulation and governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.417
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1748-5991
pISSN - 1748-5983
DOI - 10.1111/rego.12112
Subject(s) - incentive , independence (probability theory) , china , regulatory reform , civil litigation , politics , economics , political science , law and economics , public economics , law , business , market economy , statistics , mathematics
B razil's successful prosecutorial civil action against polluters could be a regulatory example for the G lobal S outh. This paper analyses whether such regulation could also develop without the major political, institutional, and legal reforms that spurred it in B razil. To do so, it analyzes C hina, where similar reforms have so far not occurred, but where prosecutors have recently started to initiate civil litigation against polluters. It finds that prosecutorial civil litigation in C hina has only a limited regulatory effect or potential. Prosecutors in C hina are influenced by conflicting incentive structures that reward one‐off lower level test cases with an innovation bonus, while structurally stimulating a focus on general crime fighting. Ironically, as a result of such incentives, the recent legal reform, toward providing standing for prosecutors in public interest litigation, will, in contrast to B razil, decrease rather than increase the regulatory effect of these cases. These findings have implications for understanding how the interaction between regulatory independence, legal reform, and regime type shapes possibilities for regulatory innovation in the G lobal S outh.