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For big comparison: Why the arguments against comparing entire religious traditions fail
Author(s) -
Decosimo David
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
religion compass
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.113
H-Index - 1
ISSN - 1749-8171
DOI - 10.1111/rec3.12265
Subject(s) - value (mathematics) , virtue , epistemology , buddhism , big data , essentialism , big idea , interpretation (philosophy) , race (biology) , psychology , sociology , social psychology , philosophy , social science , computer science , linguistics , gender studies , theology , machine learning , operating system
Abstract The nearly unanimous scholarly consensus is that one should not compare entire religious traditions. “Big comparison,” we're told, is vague, unilluminating, and misleading. And this is because religions are just too big and internally diverse to helpfully compare. Worse, big comparison implicates and extends the essentialist and colonialist legacies of the field's origins. This article contends that such arguments fail, and it argues for the inevitability of big comparison and the possibility and value of executing such comparison well. The patterns of thought in virtue of which big comparison is rejected are not only part and parcel of responsible interpretation but a consequence of commitment to holism. Engaging recent philosophical work on “generics” and considering the way concepts like race can enable illuminating comparison such as those involved in discourse about value gaps between white and black lives, I further argue that matters are not saliently different when it comes to comparing under categories like “Judaism” or “Buddhism.” As racial categories admit of useful and problematic comparative usage, so too religious categories. I conclude by offering several snapshots of fruitful big comparison and showing that the case against big comparison itself depends on the very modes of thought it wishes to proscribe.