Why Hope is not a Moral Virtue: Aquinas's Insight | Zendy

Bobier Christopher A. | Zendy

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Why Hope is not a Moral Virtue: Aquinas's Insight

Author(s) -

Bobier Christopher A.

Publication year - 2018

Publication title -

ratio

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475

H-Index - 29

eISSN - 1467-9329

pISSN - 0034-0006

DOI - 10.1111/rati.12161

Subject(s) - virtue , philosophy , epistemology , epistemic virtue , passion , environmental ethics , psychology , social psychology

There is a growing consensus among philosophers that hope is a moral virtue: the virtuously hopeful person experiences the right amount of hope for the right things. This moralization of hope presents us with a puzzle. The historical consensus is that hope is a passion and hope is a theological virtue, not a moral virtue. Thomas Aquinas, the philosopher who wrote most extensively on hope, offers an explanation for why hope is not a moral virtue. The aim of this paper is argue that Aquinas is right in thinking that hope is not a moral virtue. 1

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