Avoiding the Asymmetry Problem

Abstract If earlier‐than‐necessary death is bad because it deprives individuals of additional good life, then why isn't later‐than‐necessary conception bad for the same reason? Deprivationists have argued that prenatal non‐existence is not bad because it is impossible to be conceived earlier, but postmortem non‐existence is bad because it is possible to live longer. Call this the Impossibility Solution . In this paper, I demonstrate that the Impossibility Solution does not work by showing how it is possible to be conceived earlier in the same senses it is possible to live longer. I then offer a solution to the Asymmetry Problem by suggesting a novel way to separate the badness of each type of non‐existence from the type, and frequency, of attitudes we should have towards each type of non‐existence. Even if both types of non‐existence are equally bad, certain contingent facts about our postmortem non‐existence provide reason for the badness of early deaths to be more frequently salient than the badness of late conceptions.[Note 1. For helpful discussion and feedback on earlier drafts of ...]