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Indeterminacy, Angst and Conflicting Values
Author(s) -
Williams J. Robert G.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/rati.12141
Subject(s) - indeterminacy (philosophy) , epistemology , set (abstract data type) , psychology , economics , philosophy , social psychology , computer science , programming language
How should we make choices where the values we subscribe to give conflicting recommendations? I will be defending a reduction of decision making under conflict to decision making under indeterminacy, in the spirit of Broome.[Note 1. See John Broome (1998). ‘Is Incommensurability Vagueness?’ In: Ethics ...] To defend this, I set out and endorse the basic features of decision making under conflict that Ruth Chang identifies.[Note 2. See Ruth Chang, ‘The Possibility of Parity’, Ethics 112:4 ...] I show that we find exactly those features in cases of decision making under indeterminacy not involving conflicting values. Further, my theory of decision making under indeterminacy predicts and explains these features.[Note 3. See J. Robert G. Williams. ‘Decision Making under Indeterminacy’, ...] Particular attention will be paid to the aspect that Chang emphasizes as the decisive problem for the Broomean reduction: the resolutional residue, or angst, that decision making under conflict evinces.[Note 4. This paper has been presented at the Leeds Centre ...]