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Entailments are Cancellable
Author(s) -
Davies Alex
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/rati.12140
Subject(s) - proposition , sentence , grice , logical consequence , context (archaeology) , relation (database) , philosophy , modal , linguistics , logical truth , epistemology , computer science , history , pragmatics , chemistry , archaeology , database , polymer chemistry
Several philosophers have recently claimed that if a proposition is cancellable from an uttered sentence then that proposition is not entailed by that uttered sentence. The claim should be a familiar one. It has become a standard device in the philosopher's tool‐kit. I argue that this claim is false. There is a kind of entailment—which I call “modal entailment”—that is context‐sensitive and, because of this, cancellable. So cancellability does not show that a proposition is not entailed by an uttered sentence. I close the paper by describing an implication this has for a disagreement between J. L. Austin and Grice concerning the relation between felicity and truth.[Note 1. The research of this paper was funded by grant ...]