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Induction, Normality and Reasoning with Arbitrary Objects
Author(s) -
Valaris Markos
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/rati.12129
Subject(s) - inductive reasoning , normality , deductive reasoning , epistemology , analytic reasoning , contrast (vision) , computer science , psychology , philosophy , artificial intelligence , social psychology
This paper concerns the apparent fact — discussed by Sinan Dogramaci (2010) and Brian Weatherson (2012) — that inductive reasoning often interacts in disastrous ways with patterns of reasoning that seem perfectly fine in the deductive case. In contrast to Dogramaci's and Weatherson's own suggestions, I argue that these cases show that we cannot reason inductively about arbitrary objects. Moreover, as I argue, this prohibition is neatly explained by a certain hypothesis about the rational basis of inductive reasoning — namely, the hypothesis that inductive reasoning is fundamentally reasoning about what normally happens (in a non‐statistical sense).