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Belief is Contingently Involuntary
Author(s) -
Booth Anthony Robert
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/rati.12126
Subject(s) - judgement , norm (philosophy) , set (abstract data type) , social psychology , doxastic logic , epistemology , psychology , religious belief , philosophy , computer science , programming language
The debate between “ N ormativists” and “ T eleologists” about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explain s why it is that we cannot (non‐contingently) believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief is, that suspended judgment is not a belief (or set of beliefs), and that the aim or norm of suspended judgement cannot be constitutive if suspended judgement is not a belief (or set of beliefs).