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Mental C ausation is Not Just D ownward C ausation
Author(s) -
Engelhardt Jeff
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/rati.12111
Subject(s) - causation , prima facie , philosophy , supervenience , metaphysics , psychology , epistemology
According to a popular model of mental causation, an irreducible mental cause M 1 brings about an irreducible mental effect M 2 by bringing about M 2's supervenience base (ground, realizer, etc.), P 2. Call this ‘the D ownward C ausation V iew’. This paper raises doubts about the D ownward C ausation V iew on grounds that M 1 does not cause M 2 immediately and there is no causal chain from M 1 to M 2. Prima facie , then, M 1 does not cause M 2 on this view. But a theory of mental causation ought to account for how some mental phenomena cause other mental phenomena; so rival theories are to be preferred. After setting out the problem, I consider replies; all fail.

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