M oral R ationalism without Overridingness

M oral R ationalism is the view that if an act is morally required then it is what there is most reason to do. It is often assumed that the truth of M oral R ationalism is dependent on some version of The Overridingness Thesis, the view that moral reasons override nonmoral reasons. However, as D ouglas P ortmore has pointed out, the two can come apart; we can accept M oral R ationalism without accepting any version of The Overridingness Thesis. Nevertheless, The Overridingness Thesis serves as one of two possible explanations for M oral R ationalism. In this paper I will investigate which of these two explanations a moral rationalist should accept. I will argue that when we properly attend to the form of M oral R ationalism supported by the intuitions that motivate the view, we are left with no reason to accept The Overridingness Thesis.