On A ristotelianism and Structures as Parts

Aristotelian substance theory tells us that substances have structures (read: forms) as proper parts. This claim has recently been defended by Kathrin Koslicki who dubbed it the ‘ N eo‐ A ristotelian T hesis.’ Strangely, A ristotelianism has not yet been universally embraced by philosophers – partly because some of its claims, such as the N eo‐ A ristotelian T hesis – are viewed by some as counterintuitive at best. In this paper, I argue for A ristotelianism by showing its philosophical usefulness: specifically, I put it to use in saving the metaphysical doctrine of endurantism and some central mereological doctrines (such as Transitivity) from recent attacks. This utility gives us reason to endorse A ristotelianism. Along the way, I defend Koslicki's argument for the N eo‐ A ristotelian T hesis from a recent criticism, thus helping provide still more reason to endorse A ristotelianism: namely, K oslicki's vindicated argument.