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Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism, and Interpretation
Author(s) -
Patterson Dennis
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/raju.12216
Subject(s) - legal positivism , positivism , interpretation (philosophy) , epistemology , legal formalism , philosophy , law , sociology , legal realism , political science , legal research , black letter law , comparative law , private law , linguistics
Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.