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The Presumption of Innocence in the Trial Setting
Author(s) -
Lippke Richard L.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/raju.12074
Subject(s) - presumption of innocence , innocence , presumption , interpretation (philosophy) , frame (networking) , stern , criminal trial , law , presentation (obstetrics) , epistemology , fidelity , psychology , deception , philosophy , law and economics , political science , sociology , computer science , history , medicine , telecommunications , ancient history , linguistics , radiology
The starting frame with which jurors begin trials and the approach which they should take toward the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and defense are distinguished. A robust interpretation of the starting frame, according to which jurors should begin trials by presuming the material innocence of defendants, is defended. Alternative starting frames which are less defendant‐friendly are shown to cohere less well with the notion that criminal trials should constitute stern tests of the government's case against those it has charged with crimes. The intuitive case for the robust presumption of innocence is supplemented with empirical evidence concerning the psychology of belief formation and preservation. Various objections to the proposed starting frame are addressed.