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Sources of Law Are not Legal Norms
Author(s) -
Shecaira Fábio Perin
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/raju.12053
Subject(s) - interpretation (philosophy) , statute , legal norm , norm (philosophy) , law , relation (database) , state (computer science) , political science , epistemology , law and economics , sociology , philosophy , computer science , linguistics , algorithm , database
Abstract A nglo‐ A merican authors have paid little attention to a subtle distinction that has important jurisprudential implications. It is the distinction between sources of law (e.g., statutes, precedents, customs) and the legal norms which can be derived from sources by means of interpretation. The distinction might also be rendered as a threefold one, separating sources of law from legal norms and both of these from that which mediates their relation, namely, methods of legal interpretation. This paper intends to state the “source‐norm” distinction clearly and to give examples of jurisprudential insights that are missed, and mistakes that may be made if the distinction is not given its due.