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Politics, Competence, and Performance: Evidence from the US State Budget Agencies
Author(s) -
Yu Jinhai,
Jennings Edward T.
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
public administration review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.721
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1540-6210
pISSN - 0033-3352
DOI - 10.1111/puar.13277
Subject(s) - competence (human resources) , politics , bureaucracy , public administration , political science , democracy , social psychology , psychology , law
The relationship between administrative competence and political responsiveness is central to public administration theories. This study examines the conditional effects of competence on performance as moderated by politics. Synthesizing the theories of neutral competence and responsive competence, we propose a model of contingent competence. We argue that the impact of competence on performance is conditional on both the preferences of political principals and the degree of political control as indicated by agency politicization. With multiple indicators of state fiscal performance, the empirical test uses data on US state budget agencies between 1986 and 2008. The results support the proposition. When budget agencies are highly politicized, competence of budget agencies influences state fiscal performance in accordance with the preferences of Democratic and Republican elected officials when one or the other party controls state governments. The findings enhance the understanding of how institutional designs shape bureaucratic politics and agency performance.