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Street‐Level Bureaucrats’ Social Value Orientation On and Off Duty
Author(s) -
Cohen Nissim,
Hertz Uri
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
public administration review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.721
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1540-6210
pISSN - 0033-3352
DOI - 10.1111/puar.13190
Subject(s) - duty , incentive , value (mathematics) , sacrifice , promotion (chess) , social value orientations , work (physics) , orientation (vector space) , social psychology , prosocial behavior , business , public relations , psychology , political science , law , economics , microeconomics , engineering , computer science , mechanical engineering , geometry , mathematics , archaeology , machine learning , politics , history
Abstract Are street‐level bureaucrats more willing to sacrifice their own self‐interests to meet the needs of their clients when they are off duty or on duty? If the former is the case, what does that finding tell us about their work environment? Using the social value orientation paradigm in a mixed effects experimental design, the authors found that Israeli police officers demonstrated greater pro‐social inclinations off duty compared with on duty. Given these findings, the authors suggest the possibility that the organization's constraints and culture may, paradoxically, reduce street‐level bureaucrats’ real social value orientations and increase the promotion of their own self‐interests when they are on duty. Evidence for Practice Using an experiment, we found that police officers demonstrated more willingness to sacrifice their own interests to promote citizens’ needs when they were off duty than when they were on duty. We also found that the more years on the force police officers had, the less they demonstrated this pro‐social orientation. Our findings imply that, paradoxically, the organizational environment reduces police officers’ social value orientation when they are on duty. We discuss the possibility that managers’ imposition of extensive external rules and incentives may crowd out their subordinates’ internal pro‐social tendencies.