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Corruption as Resource Transfer: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis
Author(s) -
Jancsics David
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
public administration review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.721
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1540-6210
pISSN - 0033-3352
DOI - 10.1111/puar.13024
Subject(s) - scholarship , language change , conceptualization , typology , confusion , beneficiary , political science , resource (disambiguation) , work (physics) , law and economics , positive economics , public relations , sociology , public administration , political economy , economics , law , psychology , mechanical engineering , art , computer network , literature , artificial intelligence , computer science , anthropology , psychoanalysis , engineering
Despite significant investment in anticorruption instruments in the past decades, confusion about their effectiveness remains. While a growing body of scholarship claims that anticorruption reforms have generally failed, other scholars have shown that particular anticorruption tools may actually work. A likely explanation for these puzzling outcomes is that public administration research holds a mistaken view of corruption, and improperly selected anticorruption strategies often target the wrong type of corruption. To overcome this problem, this article proposes a four‐cell typology of corruption, reflecting two critical dimensions along which most corrupt behaviors occur: the resource transfer and the primary beneficiary. Synthesizing recent research developments, this article introduces a new conceptualization of corruption that integrates perspectives from several disciplines. It also offers a series of propositions concerning how each corruption type could be fought. The article concludes with implications for research and practice .