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Campaign‐Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance
Author(s) -
Liu Nicole Ning,
Lo Carlos WingHung,
Zhan Xueyong,
Wang Wei
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
public administration review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.721
H-Index - 139
eISSN - 1540-6210
pISSN - 0033-3352
DOI - 10.1111/puar.12285
Subject(s) - enforcement , incentive , legitimacy , compliance (psychology) , business , style (visual arts) , public economics , public administration , political science , politics , economics , microeconomics , law , social psychology , psychology , archaeology , history
This article examines the recoupling mechanism of campaign‐style enforcement and its effects on environmental regulatory compliance. Drawing on the policy implementation literature and institutional theory, the authors develop a conceptual model of campaign‐style enforcement in which both resource mobilization and power redistribution are theorized to address decoupling problems in regulatory compliance. The two‐pathway recoupling mechanism is evidenced by an empirical investigation of the implementation of China's energy conservation and emission reduction policy as part of that country's 11th Five‐Year Plan. Findings suggest that campaign‐style enforcement can effectively improve regulatory compliance when it addresses the efficiency/legitimacy conflict by providing policy incentives and reorganizing a clear hierarchy of political authority. The article concludes with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of campaign‐style enforcement.