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Legalizing a Political Fight: Congressional Abdication of War Powers in the Bush and Obama Administrations
Author(s) -
Burns Sarah
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/psq.12729
Subject(s) - presidential system , deliberation , political science , separation of powers , accountability , law , politics , abdication , impartiality , power (physics) , public administration , physics , quantum mechanics
For decades, presidents and members of Congress have actively shifted the separation of powers to provide the executive branch with more room for unilateral action in the realm of war. While this imbalance is clearest when presidents decide to act without the consent of Congress, it is still present and arguably more dangerous when Congress does provide authorization. By examining the legal language used in the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the subsequent Authorizations for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), I demonstrate how members of Congress crafted documents that were not designed to ensure presidential accountability and this allowed for the execution of poorly designed policy. Drawing on the work of scholars who emphasize the positive ends of constitutional grants of power, this essay establishes a metric for evaluating congressional deliberations on military operations. I apply this metric to deliberation about the 2003 war in Iraq and the military operation against ISIS in 2014. Neither operation compelled deliberation about the merits of action from Congress or ensured accountability from the executive after the fact.