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To Inform and Recommend: Hamilton and the Constitutional Ground for Interaction Between Executive Officers and Congress
Author(s) -
Carrington Adam M.
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/psq.12395
Subject(s) - constitution , political science , legislation , discretion , law , treasury , separation of powers , state (computer science) , government (linguistics) , administration (probate law) , linguistics , philosophy , algorithm , computer science
In today's government, executive officers interact continually with Congress on issues of legislation and administration. But does the Constitution's text support such interaction? This article argues that a basis may be found in the State of the Union and the Recommendation clauses of Article II. Combining an examination of the Constitution's text with Alexander Hamilton's at times ambiguous tenure as Treasury secretary, this article argues that such interaction fits within the structure of the two branches. Furthermore, this article distinguishes the two clauses by claiming that executive officers must respond to most requests for information but only recommend at the president's discretion.