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Some Agents are Freer than Others: Variation in the Reelection Incentive, Agency Loss, and the Timing of Democratic Interstate Conflict
Author(s) -
Koch Michael T.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/psq.12321
Subject(s) - incentive , democracy , agency (philosophy) , accountability , political science , politics , variation (astronomy) , affect (linguistics) , public administration , political economy , social psychology , economics , psychology , law , sociology , microeconomics , social science , physics , communication , astrophysics
I ask whether variations in electoral systems affect the conflict behavior of democratic leaders, specifically the timing of that conflict. Building from theories of political accountability and agency loss, I argue that the degree of agency loss coupled with variations in the principals that hold leaders accountable affects the timing of conflict in democratic systems. The results confirm the expectation that leaders in candidate‐centered systems are more likely to “gamble for resurrection” as the next election approaches than are party‐centered executives given the differences in the ability of their principals to select, sanction, and monitor them.