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Cabinets and Informal Advisory Networks in Multiparty Presidential Systems
Author(s) -
Siavelis Peter M.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/psq.12295
Subject(s) - presidential system , political science , government (linguistics) , advisory committee , public administration , latin americans , power (physics) , portfolio , public relations , law , business , politics , philosophy , linguistics , physics , finance , quantum mechanics
There is virtually no literature on informal presidential advisory networks in Latin America. By employing Chile as a theoretically grounded case study, this article demonstrates that multiparty coalition management inserts unique tensions into the presidential advisory equation, and thus unique challenges for presidents in achieving their governing goals when compared to single party government. It also contributes to theory building by underscoring how the interaction between formal portfolio distribution and informal advisory networks helps determine success of cross‐party power sharing arrangements. Finally, it makes some tentative suggestions concerning the optimal formula for presidents to resolve tensions between formal and informal advisory networks under multiparty presidentialism.