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The Limits to Power without Persuasion
Author(s) -
Dickinson Matthew J.,
Gubb Jesse
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/psq.12251
Subject(s) - legislature , presidential system , legislation , statute , political science , persuasion , premise , public administration , toolbox , homeland security , power (physics) , law , law and economics , politics , sociology , terrorism , engineering , psychology , social psychology , physics , quantum mechanics , mechanical engineering , linguistics , philosophy
Research on executive action often assumes that presidents face an either/or decision between issuing an administrative order and seeking legislation. This premise, however, ignores differing structural characteristics of administrative and legislative policy vehicles. This article will argue that, rather than see administrative actions as equivalent to legislation, presidents understand the distinct advantages and disadvantages each policy instrument brings and act accordingly. Using data linking executive orders (EOs) and presidential legislative proposals, as well as a case study of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, we show that when presidents issue more EOs, they do not issue fewer legislative proposals. In fact, presidents sometimes follow up on significant EOs with proposals to enshrine them in statute. Our research supports viewing EOs as a tool in the legislative toolbox rather than a challenge to the legislative process.