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Presidents and Party Teams: The Politics of Debt Limits and Executive Oversight, 2001‐2013
Author(s) -
Lee Frances E.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/psq.12066
Subject(s) - presidential system , opposition (politics) , political science , politics , divided government , public administration , debt , politics of the united states , administration (probate law) , law , economics , finance
This article analyzes the president's leadership predicament in light of purely partisan considerations in Congress, meaning members' interests in winning and holding control of national institutions. I examine congressional votes to raise the debt limit, which are highly dependent upon patterns of institutional party control. I also examine high‐profile congressional charges of administration misdoing, another arena in which members of the president's party behave starkly differently from members of the president's opposition. These differences have consequences for presidential leadership, no matter the configuration of party control of national institutions.