Premium
Political Power and Policy Design: Why Are Policy Alternatives Constrained?
Author(s) -
Öberg PerOla,
Lundin Martin,
Thelander Jonas
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
policy studies journal
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1541-0072
pISSN - 0190-292X
DOI - 10.1111/psj.12086
Subject(s) - politics , opposition (politics) , public economics , political process , political science , policy analysis , process (computing) , policy studies , public administration , economics , public policy , political economy , law , computer science , operating system
Little research examines the stage of the policy process during which policy alternatives are formulated. Using quantitative and qualitative data from Swedish local politics, we address this deficiency by analyzing the process by which the number of specific policy alternatives is reduced. The findings suggest that, in approximately 20 percent of issues, more than one alternative will reach all politicians making the binding decisions. Most local politicians, in both the majority and opposition factions, think that they lack sufficient information on alternative policy designs. We also find a “political bias,” that is, alternatives are discarded at an early stage because they are deemed not politically feasible. Politicians outside the inner circles, especially those with higher education, would like to see more policy alternatives to discuss and from which they can make choices.