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Fairness Among Servers When Capacity Decisions Are Endogenous
Author(s) -
Geng Xin,
Huh Woonghee Tim,
Nagarajan Mahesh
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
production and operations management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.279
H-Index - 110
eISSN - 1937-5956
pISSN - 1059-1478
DOI - 10.1111/poms.12305
Subject(s) - server , computer science , nash equilibrium , routing (electronic design automation) , class (philosophy) , microeconomics , uniqueness , game theory , service (business) , operations research , mathematical economics , mathematical optimization , distributed computing , computer network , economics , business , mathematics , marketing , artificial intelligence , mathematical analysis
We look at a simple service system with two servers serving arriving jobs (single class). Our interest is in examining the effect of routing policies on servers when they care about fairness among themselves, and when they can endogenously choose capacities in response to the routing policy. Therefore, we study the two‐server game where the servers’ objective functions have a term explicitly modeling fairness. Moreover, we focus on four commonly seen policies that are from one general class. Theoretical results concerning the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are proved for some policies. Further managerial insights are given based on simulation studies on servers’ equilibrium/off‐equilibrium behaviors and the resulting system efficiency performance under different policies.