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Quality Testing and Product Rationing by Input Suppliers
Author(s) -
Arya Anil,
Gong Ning,
Ramanan Ram N.V.
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
production and operations management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.279
H-Index - 110
eISSN - 1937-5956
pISSN - 1059-1478
DOI - 10.1111/poms.12186
Subject(s) - quality (philosophy) , production (economics) , business , product (mathematics) , rationing , incentive , supply chain , discretion , industrial organization , marketing , product testing , economics , microeconomics , health care , philosophy , geometry , mathematics , epistemology , political science , law , economic growth
Quality testing by suppliers has significant ramifications for downstream supply chain participants and retail consumers. This article focuses on such implications accounting for the fact that suppliers often enjoy discretion in quality testing and reporting. Under a discretionary testing and reporting environment, we show that a supplier can improve the market's perception of product quality by engaging in self‐imposed production cuts. Production cuts dampen supplier incentives to engage in excessive quality testing, putting the supplier and the market on a more equal information footing. This reduces the market's need to skeptically discount product quality to protect itself. The improved market perception, then, reduces quality testing demand, introducing cost savings. The result that costly production cuts can improve quality perceptions indicates that the groundwork for influencing market perceptions may have to be laid upfront, even prior to acquiring private information, providing a contrast to routine signaling models.