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Limits of Abductivism About Logic
Author(s) -
Hlobil Ulf
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12707
Subject(s) - arbiter , philosophy of logic , epistemology , computer science , dynamic logic (digital electronics) , order (exchange) , and gate , philosophy , algorithm , logic gate , economics , engineering , transistor , finance , voltage , parallel computing , electrical engineering
I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to solve by abduction.