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Relational Primitivism
Author(s) -
Zylberman Ariel
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
philosophy and phenomenological research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.7
H-Index - 39
eISSN - 1933-1592
pISSN - 0031-8205
DOI - 10.1111/phpr.12662
Subject(s) - property (philosophy) , relational theory , epistemology , philosophy , sociology , psychology , quantum mechanics , physics
What kind of property is represented by the moral ought? I defend a relational answer: the moral ought represents a primitive relational property of actions required by the original claims of persons. I argue that the relational answer offers a distinctive and compelling account in its own right that also avoids standard difficulties of familiar theories.